Minggu, 26 April 2009

User-Mode Linux

User-Mode Linux

Honeynets can be difficult to configure and resource intensive to deploy, requiring a variety of technologies and
systems. Many users or organization that want to research Honeynets may not have the resources for
deployments. Therefore, this paper will focus on building a Honeynet using a single computer and free,
OpenSource software. This will be accomplished by building a Virtual Honeynet, using the OpenSource solutions
User-Mode Linux (often called UML) and IPTables. The format of this is paper is a HOWTO, it will describe step
by step how to build a Honeynet on a single computer and then discuss one method of deploying Honeynet Data
Control and Data Capture. This paper assumes you have already read and understand the concepts in KYE:
Honeynets and the paper KYE: Virtual Honeynets. This paper will not go into detail on how to deploy advance
Honeynet technologies. That will come later in the future paper Know Your Enemy: GenII Honeynet. Instead, this
paper will cover in detail how to build a Honeynet testing environment using basic Honeynet technologies. If this is
the first time you have ever built or deployed a Honeynet, we HIGHLY recommend that you first deploy this in a
lab or test environment. You have been warned.
Plan of Attack
This paper is broken down into five parts. In the first part we will describe what UML is, how it works, and how to
install and configure it. In the second part, we describe how to create a network of multiple systems on your single
computer, including all network issues. In the third part we describe how to implement Data Control on your UML
Honeynet using IPTables. In the fourth part we describe how to implement Data Capture using Snort. Finally, in
the fifth part, we describe how to test your setup.
Part I: User Mode Linux
User-Mode Linux is an OpenSource solution that creates a virtual Machine. Created and maintained by Jeff Dike,
you can find it at UML allows you to run multiple instances of Linux on the
same system at the same time. This capability is similar to the commercial solution VMware, however UML is
currently limited to Linux. UML is designed for a variety of purposes, such as kernel debugging, testing
applications, etc. We are going to use this capability to run a Honeynet on a single computer, specifically a single
gateway with one honeypot behind it. For this purpose of this paper, we will explain how to install and run UML on
a Red Hat 7.3 system. We will use the same terminology used in VMware software, specifically the Host system
is the original operating system running on the box. Any and all additional operating systems added (the virtual
operating systems) will be called Guest systems. To visualize this deployment, refer to Figure 1 in the KYE:
Virtual Honeynets paper.
Unlike VMware, UML does not require any additional virtualization software. Instead, you patch the source of the
Linux kernel you want to run as your Guest OS. This UML patch converts the kernel into a executable binary
called 'linux', which allows the Guest kernel to run on your system as a seperate operating system. When you run
this UML patched kernel, all you need to do is give it a filesystem to use, and you now have a independent Linux
system running on your computer, two for the price of one! This new kernel is a userspace application running on
the real kernel (Host OS). The UML kernel receives system calls from its applications and sends/requests them to
the Host kernel. There are also additional management and networking UML tools you can install on the computer that makes your life easier.
Some of the most exciting features that have recently been added to UML are designed specifically for
honeypots. These capabilities signifigantly improve our UML Honeynet. We will highlight three of these
capabilities below, however you can find the technical details and HOWTO at http://user-modelinux.
 TTY Logging: UML has the capability to capture all of the attacker's keystrokes, even if they use
encryption, such as SSH, to communicate with the UML honeypot. UML does this with a patch to the tty
driver which logs all traffic through tty devices out to the host. In contrast to the physical honeypot logging
mechanisms, this is undetectable and unsubvertable. It causes no network traffic or anything else which
can be detected from within the honeypot. It's also in the UML kernel, which means it can't be defeated by
anything the intruder might do.
 hppfs: One of the concerns with a virtual honeypot is fingerprinting. Once an attacker has access to the
virtual OS, they may be able to determine it is a honeypot. UML mitigates this risk with the ability to modify
the /proc file system to appear as a true operating system.
 skas Mode: UML was recently reworked to allow it to run in a mode in which the UML kernel is in a totally
separate host address space from its processes. This makes the UML kernel binary and data totally
invisible to its processes, and to anyone logged in to it. It also makes UML kernel data secure from
tampering by its processes.
To build and install UML we will use a prebuilt rpm. RPM is a package manager for Red Hat Linux, allowing us to
simply install entire packages of software. The UML package will do two things for us. First, it installs a prebuilt
kernel with the UML patch, this is installed as the executable binary 'linux'. This will allow us to run a seperate
Linux kernel. In addition, this package contains all of the UML utilities. You can download all UML binaries and
source code from the UML Download Site. Below is the command used to install a prebuilt UML rpm for a 2.4.19
kernel. You can then see what files and utilities it installs.
host #rpm -ivh user_mode_linux-
host #rpm -ql user_mode_linux-
/usr/bin/linux <- executable binary that is really the UML kernel, the Guest OS
Thats it! By installing this RPM you have accomplished two things. First, you have installed the executable kernel
(/usr/bin/linux), this is our Guest kernel. Second, you have installed various UML utilities. If you want to run any
additional kernels at the same time, you only have to download the prebuilt UML kernels, or use the UML patch
on kernel source code. (** NOTE: Based on our testing, it appears the RPM uml version 2.4.19-5 can only handle
running one running kernel at a time. If you want to run multiple kernels, you will have to download the latest UML
kernel patch.)
Okay, there is only one step left for our Guest kernel, a file system. What good is having another kernel when
there is no file system for an attacker to interact with? Once again, we go to the UML Download Site and find prebuilt
filesystem images. Or if you prefer, you can simply build your own taking a dd(1) image of an existing file
system. For the purpose of this HOWTO, we install and use the RedHat 7.2 server file system image (65 MB in
compressed size). We have modified this file system to include the binaries telnet(1), vi(1), and pico(1). Once you
have downloaded the image, you are ready to go, no configuration involved. To start your new Guest operating
system, you simply uncompress the downloaded filesystem image, then startup your linux binary using the
filesystem. The command would look like:
host #gzip -d root_fs.rh-7.2-server.pristine.20021012.gz
host #linux ubd0=root_fs.rh-7.2-server.pristine.20021012
When you execute the 'linux' command, you should see in your terminal a new operating system booting up. You
should hopefully end up with a login prompt. Just login with the user 'root' and the password 'root' giving you
access to the operating system. Congrats, you did it! Now, lets explain what you just did, and where to go from
Part II: Setting up the Network
Okay, now that you are running two operating systems, the next step is to get the Guest OS, our honeypot, to
route through our gateway and out to the Internet. This means, if anyone wants to talk to our Guest OS, they first
have to go through the Host. You may not realize it, but you have already setup all the issues involved. Refer to
the last command above we executed, where we launched the command 'linux', specifically the part
eth0=tuntap,,, This command does two things. First, it creates a new logical interface on the Host
system called tap0. This logical interface is now the gateway interface for the Guest OS, our honeypot. The IP
address of the tap0 interface, and the default gateway of the Guest OS, is The only thing that will
be different for you is the IP address of eth0 on your Host system, this will vary depending on whatever you
configured it as. In the case of our example, it will be To confirm your setup, on the Host OS run the
host #ifconfig -a
The eth0 part of the command creates the interface eth0 on the Guest OS, telling it the interface logically routes
through tap0 on the Host system. The only thing we have left is to give the eth0 on our Guest OS an IP address
on interface eth0. This is already done on our pre-built file systems. In the case of our pre-built RedHat 7.2 server,
its IP address on eth0 is If you want to change any of the configurations on the Guest RedHat
server, you simply make those modifications like you would on any other system. To confirm this setup, run on the
Guest OS the commands:
guest #ifconfig -a
guest #netstat -nr
For a better idea of what your virtual network now looks like, refer to Figure 2.
The next step is to confirm that the Guest system can talk to and route through the gateway. This means you
want to first ping the IP address of the default gateway, in this case This is in reality interface tap0
on the Host system. Once you confirm that you can ping the internal interface, attempt to ping the external
interface of Host system (most likely the IP address bound to eth0). This ensure that you are also routing through
the Host system. If ping did not work, ensure you are not running a firewall on the Host, and double check your
network setting on the Host and Guest operating system. To confirm this setup, on the Guest OS run the
guest #ping
guest #ping (external IP of Host OS, interface eth0)
Part III: Data Control
Once you have setup the UML and networking, the next step is Data Control. The purpose of Data Control is to
contain what the attacker can do inbound and outbound of the Honeynet. Typically, we allow anything inbound to
the Honeynet systems, but limit outbound connections. For the purpose of this paper, we will use IPTables, an
OpenSource firewall solution that comes with Linux. IPTables is a highly flexible stateful firewall, including the
ability for connection limiting, network address translation, logging, and many other features. We will configure
IPTables to act as a filter on our Host, counting outbound packets. Once a limit has been met for outbound
connections, all further attempts are blocked, preventing the compromised honeypot from harming other systems.
Configuring and implementing these capabilities can be extremely complex. However, the Honeynet Project has develop an IPTables script called rc.firewall that does all the work for you. You merely have to modify the script
variables as they apply to your Honeynet, then run the script.
The first thing you have to decide is if you want your gateway to run in layer three routing mode, or layer two
bridging mode. Layer two bridging (also known as GenII, or 2nd generation) is the prefered method. When your
gateway is acting as a bridge, there is no routing or TTL decrement of packets, it acts as an invisible filtering
device, making it much more difficult for attackers to detect. However, for IPTables to work in bridging mode, your
kernel must be patched to support it. By default, most kernels do not support IPTables in bridging mode. Red Hat
kernel 2.4.18-3 is one of the few that does support this by default. If you want to patch your kernel to support this,
you can find the patch at For the purpose of this howto, we will
assume your Kernel does NOT support IPTables in bridging mode. So we will describe how to build your virtual
Honeynet with your gateway in routing mode using Network Address Translation.
Lets cover how to configure the rc.firewall script to implement this functionality. There are two critical areas to
configure, the networking issues and control issues. For networking, we have to identify the IP addresses and the
networks of the Host and Guest systems. If you are running in layer three routing mode, the script takes care of all
Network Address Translation issues. If you are running in layer two bridging mode, the script takes care of all
bridging issues. Remember, for the purpose of this paper we are using layer three routing. For control, we have to
define how many outbound connections we allow from the Guest systems. There will be at least five variables that
will be different on your system, and you will have to modify. Specifically,
First, by default the rc.firewall script runs in layer two bridging mode. You will have to modify it to run in layer three
routing mode.
# The MODE variable tells the script to #setup a bridge HoneyWall
# or a NATing HoneyWall.
Second, you will need to set the public IP address of the Guest OS. This is the external IP address you use for
Network Address Translation. This is also the IP address hackers will use to attack your virtual honeypot. If you
are using your gateway in bridging mode, this variable will also be used, however you give it the real IP's of the
honeypots, as there is no address translation. PUBLIC_IP=""
Third, you will need to configure the internal IP address of the honeypot. This is the real IP address of your Guest
OS. This variable is not used if you are in bridging mode.
Fourth, you will need to configure the external IP address of the Host OS. This is the external IP address of your
firewall, your gateway. For our example, we use the following.
Last, you will need to identify the name of the internal interface of the Host OS. By default, this is eth1. However,
we are using the virtual interface tap0, and have to modify this variable.
These are the minimum varaibles you have to modify, there may be others depending on the configuration of your
system. There are other options you can update, such as remote management, limiting what connections the
firewall can initiate, and giving your honepyots unrestricted DNS access. Also, by default, the script limits each
honeypot the following outbound connections per hour; 9 TCP connections, 20 UDP connections, 50 ICMP
connections, and 10 IP other. Details of the script are beyond the scope of this paper. To better understand these
variables, we recommend you review the script in detail and try out the different options in a lab environment.
Once you have configured the rc.firewall script, you implement it by executing the script.
host #/.rc.firewall
To confirm you have successfully ran the script, there are two thing you want to check. First, ensure that address
translation is working. You can confirm this if a new, logical interface has been added to the Host system.
Second, review the IPTables rules.
host #ifconfig -a
host #iptables -L -n
Once confirmed, your Data Control is in place. There are also a variety of other tools for implementing Data
Control. For example, you can incorporate the use of Snort-Inline to block or modify known attacks. This is done
by taking advantage of the QUEUE option in the IPTable scripts. Other options include use of bandwidth
throttling. However, these advance capabilities are beyond the scope of this paper. For additional options, check
out Honeynet Tools Section.
Part IV: Data Capture
Once we have completed Data Control, the next step is Data Capture. The purpose of Data Capture is to capture
all of the attacker's activity, without them knowing. There are a variety of methods to implement this, however we
will focus on two, IPTable logs and Snort. IPTable logs are the logs generated by the firewall whenever there is an
inbound or outbound connection. Snort is an OpenSource IDS solution which we will use to capture all network
activity. As we discussed earlier, UML also has the capabilities to capture all TTY activity from kernel space.
For IPTables, the logging has already been configured for us with the rc.firewall script. It is configured to log all
new inbound and outbound connection to /var/log/messages. Any inbound connection is an indication of a probe,
scan, or attack. Any outbound connection indicates that a honeypot has been compromised. The value of IPTable
logs is one primarily for alerting. The logs do not have enough information to tell us what the attacker is doing. For
Snort, we configure it to capture every packet and its full payload that enters or leaves the Honeynet. Linked here
is a Snort config file that will capture and log attacker activity.. You will find a simple Snort startup script that starts
Snort and uses the recommended Snort config file. Be sure to update the startup script to monitor the tap0
interface of the Host OS. You will most likey want to run this script daily, running the script from cron.
host #./
There are also a variety of other tools for implementing Data Capture which are beyond the scope of this paper,
such as Sebek. For additional options, check out Honeynet Tools Section.
Part V: Testing Your UML Honeynet
The fifth, and final step, of building our UML Honeynet is to test our configuration, specifically Data Control and
Data Capture. We want to ensure that our Honeynet requirements are behaving as expected. Testing Data
Control is relatively simple. We want to ensure that any attempt by the honeypot to initiate an outbound
connection is both logged and controlled. By logged, all connection attempts should log an entry
to /var/log/messages, alerting us that an outbound connection has been initiated, and the honeypot has most
likely been compromised. Also, once the limit has been met, we want to ensure that no more outbound
connection are allowed. For the purposes of this paper, we will test outbound TCP connections, which by default
are limited to 9 attempts per hour. To test this we will need two terminal windows open.
First we open a terminal on the Host OS and monitor the IPTable logs in /var/log/messages. When we initiate
outbound connections from the Guest OS through our Host gateway, we should see the attempts logged there.
This information is critical for alerting purposes, indicating the honeypot has been hacked, and the attacker (or
automated tool) is attempting outbound connections. Starting with the 10th outbound attempt, the TCP
connections should be blocked (the limit was met) and logged. Below is the command you want to execute before
attempting any outbound connection.
host #tail -f /var/log/messages
Next, open a terminal on the honeypot system, our Guest OS. From there you will initiate a variety of outbound
TCP connections. For example, from the Guest OS attempt to Telnet to a different systems on the external network. It does not matter if these systems exist or not, just as long as the initial connection is
attempted. The packets should be routed through the tap0 interface on our Host OS system and logged by the
IPTables firewall in /var/log/messages. We should see nine connections allowed outbound, then anymore after
that dropped. All these attempts should be logged.

Guest #telnet
Guest #telnet 21
Guest #telnet 80
Guest #telnet 6667
If you see the attempts logged, and blocked after the limit. You have successfully implemented Data Control.
Next, we want to ensure that Data Capture is happening, specifically that the Snort process is capturing all
packets and their full payload that are entering and leaving the Honeynet. A Snort process should be monitoring
the internal interface of the Host OS, specifically tap0. To test this, attempt to ping several systems on the network.
Guest #ping -c 3
The Snort process should have captured the three ICMP Echo Request packets and their full payload. It should
have logged the activity to tcpdump binary log format. To confirm, review the log file, an example is below.
host #snort -vdr *snort.log
Thats it! You have just completed a very basic test of your Data Control and Data Capture capabilities. There are
far more advance tests you can attempt, such as using a second, seperate computer to act as a system on the
Internet and interact with the honeypot. However that is beyond the scope of this paper.

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